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1. INTRODUCTION
Jury design is a critical element of criminal adjudication. After more
than six centuries without change, the structure and functioning of juries have recently undergone several signiﬁcant transformations regarding jury size and voting requirements. Juries in a criminal case
were traditionally composed of 12 members, who needed to reach a
unanimous agreement to render a decision.1 Although most Americans view the 12-member jury as a ﬁxture of American legal procedure, several US Supreme Court decisions have afﬁrmed the constitutionality of juries with fewer than 12 members, as well as juries
operating under a voting requirement less stringent than unanimity.
This article seeks to evaluate the desirability—or lack thereof—of these
institutional transformations by analyzing the impact of changes in
jury size and voting requirements on the probability of wrongful convictions, wrongful acquittals (i.e., convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty, respectively), and hung juries.
Prior literature on jury design has investigated jury size and voting
requirements as independent policy variables or in pairwise choice
frameworks, but this literature has often neglected the critical interdependence of jury size and voting requirements in maximizing the accuracy of verdicts. Prior contributions have separately investigated how
large a jury should be (Paroush 1997; Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2000;
Dharmapala and McAdams 2003; Helland and Raviv 2008; Luppi and
Parisi 2013) and how juries should vote to reach an accurate verdict
(Klevorick and Rothschild 1979; Klevorick, Rothschild, and Winship
1984; Ladha 1995; Young 1995; Neilson and Winter 2005).
Our article contributes to the existing literature by exposing the
critical interplay between jury size and voting requirement in criminal adjudication. We extend the criminal trial model developed in
Neilson and Winter (2000, 2005) by both relaxing the unanimity requirement and varying the jury size. We investigate how different
combinations of these two institutional variables affect the probabilities of accurate verdicts, wrongful verdicts, and hung juries. Our results reveal that jury size and voting requirements should inversely
depend on one another: large nonunanimous juries or small unanimous juries are alternative solutions to maximize the accuracy of
verdicts. We discuss these ﬁndings in the light of recent legal transformations to jury structure, and we offer insights for policy analysis.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the
legal and economic backgrounds on jury design. Section 3 presents
1
In the leading 1898 case Thompson v. Utah, the Court construed the Sixth
Amendment to require that in all criminal cases, a jury must be composed of exactly
12 persons.
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the criminal trial model. Section 4 introduces a numerical example to
investigate how different combinations of a jury’s institutional characteristics affect the probability of wrongful convictions and wrongful
acquittals, as well as the ability of the jury to reach a deliberation. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our results and their relevance for
policy purposes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
For the last six centuries, criminal verdicts have been rendered by juries
composed of 12 members, deliberating unanimously. In recent years,
the US Supreme Court has granted states the freedom to reduce the size
of juries and to relax the jury’s voting requirement, allowing nonunanimous verdicts. The changes have taken place through a series of cases
decided by the US Supreme Court between 1968 and 1979. In one of
these cases, the well-known Williams v. Florida, the Supreme Court
recognized that a verdict rendered unanimously by fewer than 12 jurors
was not inconsistent with the constitutional right to have a trial by
jury.2 In a subsequent decision, Ballew v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
set a lower limit on jury size, afﬁrming that any jury with fewer than six
members would be unconstitutional because it would be too small to
be representative of the relevant community.3
Other important changes took place with respect to the jury’s voting requirement. Unanimity for criminal verdicts has generally been
viewed as an important requirement to preserve the public conﬁdence
in the criminal justice system, because wrongful convictions of innocent defendants are less likely under unanimity (Coughlan 2000).4
However, unanimity allows any single juror to veto a proposed verdict
and single-handedly lead to a mistrial. The increasing administrative
and ﬁnancial cost of mistrials led some states to consider criminal justice reforms that relaxed the unanimity requirement.5 These state reforms were challenged at the federal level.
In the leading cases—namely, Duncan v. Louisiana, Johnson v.
Louisiana, and Apodaca v.Oregon—the US Supreme Court ruled that
verdicts reached under a qualiﬁed majority rule do not violate the US

Williams v. Florida, 3399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
4
See Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5
See, e.g., Hannaford-Agor et al.’s (2002) NCSC (National Center for State Courts)
multiphased research on mistrials, motivated by the concern that mistrials were
reaching unacceptably high levels in some jurisdictions. See also Kalven and Zeisel’s
(1966) study of the American jury, which brieﬂy discussed the phenomenon of mistrials in criminal cases.
2
3
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Constitution.6 This ruling gave states the ﬂexibility to pursue criminal justice reforms by allowing verdicts to be reached under a qualiﬁed
majority rule. In 1979, the Court in Burch v. Louisiana held that states
could either reduce jury size or lessen the voting requirement but not
both simultaneously: nonunanimous verdicts could only be rendered
by juries of 12, and smaller juries could only deliberate unanimously.7
As of today, only Oklahoma, Oregon, and Louisiana allow nonunanimous verdicts in misdemeanor cases; Oregon and Louisiana also allow
them in felony cases.8
The abolition of the unanimity requirement for criminal verdicts was met with a mixture of approval and skepticism. Supporters
viewed nonunanimous decision-making as a possible solution to the
hung-jury problem (e.g., Amar 1994; Glasser 1996; Morehead 1997).
Opponents viewed the abolition of the unanimity requirement as a violation of a fundamental principle of criminal justice for the protection of innocent defendants (e.g., Kachmar 1996; Smith 1996; Klein
and Klastorin 1999).9 The views in the literature are split, revealing
an objective difﬁculty in balancing the policy goals of accuracy in adjudication and reduction of the costs of criminal justice.
Several law and economics contributions have investigated the effects of changing jury size on the expected trial outcomes. A central
argument in the literature on juries and jury decision making is that
a group will make a better decision than an individual (Condorcet’s
jury theorem). Some contributions reﬁned Condorcet’s jury theorem
and demonstrated that, under certain conditions, this theorem does
not hold (e.g., in the presence of strategic voting, as shown by Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). For example, larger, unanimous juries
may be more likely to reach an accurate verdict but may fail to reach
any decision at all. Hence, a trade-off emerges between accuracy and
6
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
7
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
8
See Oregon Revised Statutes §136.450, and Louisiana Laws Code of Criminal Procedure 782. Several states permit nonunanimous verdicts in civil trials. See State
Court Organization, 1998, Figure 42 (Trial Juries: Size and Verdict Rules). For more
extensive discussions on these state regulations and mistrials, see Hannaford-Agor
et al. (2002) and Luppi and Parisi (2013).
9
See also Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997), proving that the optimal rule for ﬁxedsize committees in dichotomous choice situations is the qualiﬁed weighted majority.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) showed that when jurors behave strategically, the
probability of convicting the innocent in large juries is higher under the unanimity
rule than under qualiﬁed majority rules. When there is uncertainty about jurors’ preferences, in the presence of strategic jurors with private information, the unanimity
rule may still be preferable to protect innocent defendants against wrongful convictions (Luppi and Parisi 2013).
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decisiveness (Luppi and Parisi 2013). Notwithstanding the widespread
adoption of smaller juries in state criminal courts, statistics indicate
that overall mistrial rates have not declined (Kalven and Zeisel
1966; Hannaford-Agor et al. 2002). A few empirical studies have attempted to evaluate how jury size affects trial results. Most of them
concluded that there is no detectable difference between 6-member
and 12-member juries with respect to mistrial rates (e.g., HannafordAgor et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 2005). By contrast, experimental studies and statistical models on jury size found that jury size does affect
trial outcomes and jurors’ behavior (e.g., Guarnaschelli, McKelvey,
and Palfrey 2000; Mukhopadhaya 2003; Helland and Raviv 2008).
For example, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) revealed
that larger juries may convict fewer innocent defendants than smaller
juries under unanimity.
Our key original contribution to the literature is the speciﬁcation
of a different objective function that should guide the design of juries. Whereas previous studies have focused on either jury size or
voting requirement, in this article, we reveal the crucial interdependence of these two variables, and we analyze their optimal combination in minimizing the probabilities of wrongful convictions and
hung juries.
3. CRIMINAL TRIAL MODEL
In this section, we construct a simple model of the criminal trial process to analyze how varying jury size and voting requirement affects
different expected trial outcomes.10
We follow the classical jury model (e.g., Miceli 1990; Feddersen
and Pesendorfer 1998; Coughlan 2000; Neilson and Winter 2000, 2005;
Duggan and Martinelli 2001; Persico 2004). There are two states of
the world, I and G (Innocent and Guilty). Let P(G) denote the prior
probability that the defendant is guilty and 1 − P(G) the prior probability that the defendant is innocent. Let s be the strength of evidence
found against the defendant, whereby stronger evidence is associated
with a higher probability of guilt. Let f(sjG) and f(sjI) be the probability
density functions of the strength of evidence given that the defendant
is guilty or innocent, respectively, and let F(sjG) and F(sjI) be the corresponding cumulative functions. The two density functions are represented in ﬁgure 1.

10
Our model relies on Neilson and Winter’s (2005) theoretical setup with the main
difference that we vary not only voting requirements but also jury size. For a similar
formulation of the court’s problem, see also Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987).
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Figure 1. The distribution of evidence (Neilson and Winter 2000, 2005).

The traditional standard of proof in criminal trials in the United
States is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, where each juror must
individually believe in the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt.11 As in Neilson and Winter (2000, 2005), to model the
reasonable-doubt standard we assume that some evidence is inconsistent with an innocent defendant. Speciﬁcally, an innocent defendant
can generate evidence in the interval [0, sI], whereas a guilty defendant
can generate evidence in the interval [sG, 1], with 0 ≤ sG < sI < 1. If a
juror observes s ≥ sI , that juror can state that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The opposite holds when s < sI . Put another
way, sI represents the reasonable-doubt standard threshold.12
11
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard has been used in criminal trials since at
least the 1700s. It was adopted by most jurisdictions even before the case In re
Winship (397 U.S. 358, 1970) and recognized as a constitutional requirement.
12
The reasonable-doubt standard threshold follows from Judge Blackstone’s dictum that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”
(Blackstone 1769). Blackstone’s ratio of 10 to 1—or any variation of such ratio in state
case law (Rizzolli and Saraceno 2013; Pi, Parisi, and Luppi 2020)—follows from the
fact that a wrongful conviction in criminal adjudication (i.e., convicting the innocent)
is perceived to be worse than a wrongful acquittal (i.e., acquitting the guilty). For a
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Analytically, this is equivalent to assuming that the probability
density function for a guilty defendant ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the probability distribution function of an innocent defendant.
Thus, under ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, it is more likely to ﬁnd
incriminating evidence for a guilty defendant than an innocent defendant.13 Graphically, the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance is represented by the fact that the f(sjG) distribution is shifted further to the
right than the f(sjI) distribution.14
As in Neilson and Winter (2005), we introduce juror heterogeneity
by assuming that jurors do not directly observe the true evidence s, but
they rather observe signals of varying strength related to the evidence.15 Juror heterogeneity is a necessary assumption: if all individual jurors were perfectly able to observe the true strength of evidence,
juries would always reach unanimous verdicts. However, this is not
the case in real-world criminal trials, as the actual rates of hung juries
and judicial errors show (e.g., Hannaford-Agor et al. 2002).
Each juror assesses evidence differently and, as a result, can express
different opinions when deliberating for a verdict. Another interpretation of the weak/strong signal is that jurors are heterogeneously informed. This may be driven by differing levels of juror sensitivity to
the arguments presented by the prosecutor or defense counsel, or it
may be driven by other factors that affect the persuasion of relevant
facts or evidence presented at trial.
Speciﬁcally, each juror has a probability p ∈ (0, 1) of receiving a
strong signal of incriminating evidence, sS = s + x, with x ≥ 0, and a
probability 1 − p of receiving a weak signal of incriminating evidence,

discussion on the standard of proof in criminal law, see, e.g., Garoupa (2017) and
Wickelgren (2017). Variations in the standard of proof may affect the optimal combination of jury size and voting requirement and vice versa. For an analysis on the optimal standard of proof in conjunction with alternative combinations of jury size and
voting requirement, see Guerra and Parisi (2019).
13
The assumption of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance has also been used by
Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987), Miceli (1990, 2009, 125), and Feess and Wohlschlegel
(2009).
14
Formally, for any evidence level s, f(sjG) ≥ f(sjI). Equivalently, in terms of the cumulative distribution function, F(sjG) ≤ F(sjI). Note, in the following analysis, as jury
design changes the shapes of the functions, f(sjI) and f(sjG) remain unchanged. For a similar setting, see Miceli (1990), Neilson and Winter (2005), and Rizzolli and Saraceno
(2013).
15
This is equivalent to assuming that jurors observe s with bias, as in Neilson and
Winter (2000), or that jurors hold different beliefs about the true strength of evidence,
as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey
(2000). For other forms of juror heterogeneity, see, e.g., Arce, Fariña, and Sobral (1996)
and Alpern and Chen (2017).
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sW = s − y < sS , with y ≥ 0.16 A juror who receives the strong signal
votes to convict if sS ≥ sI , that is, if s ≥ sI − x, as represented in ﬁgure 1.
A juror who receives the weak signal votes to convict if sW ≥ sI , that is,
if s ≥ sI + y, as represented in ﬁgure 1. In a nutshell, a juror receiving
the strong signal is more likely to believe that the defendant is guilty
beyond any reasonable doubt than is a juror receiving the weak signal.
Let N ∈ ½1, 2 , ::: , n denote the size of a jury, and m ∈ ½0, 1 denote the majority to reach a verdict. For the majority rule case,
mN is the smallest integer greater than N=2; for the unanimity case,
m = 1.17
Let X be a random variable that follows the binomial distribution
X ∼ B(N, p). The probability that mN jurors receive the strong signal
N )p mN (1 −
(or, equivalently, vote to convict) PC = Pr(X = mN) = ( mN
N−m N
. Similarly, let Y be a random variable which follows the binop)
mial distribution Y ∼ B(N, 1 − p). The probability that mN jurors
receive the weak signal (or, equivalently, vote to acquit) is PA =
N )(1 − p)mN pN−mN . The probability that a jury is
Pr(Y = mN) = ( mN
neither prone to convict nor prone to acquit is PB = 1 − PA − PC .
We can now derive the probabilities of a wrongful conviction, a
wrongful acquittal, and a hung jury in a single trial.18
A wrongful conviction occurs when (a) the defendant is innocent,
which occurs with probability 1 − P(G); (b) the jury is likely to convict (or, equivalently, mN jurors receive the strong signal), which occurs with probability PC; and (c) the evidence is sufﬁciently strong to
meet the reasonable-doubt standard, that is, s ≥ sI − x. Putting this
all together, the probability of a wrongful conviction PWC is given as
PWC = ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)PC :

(1)

16
We follow Neilson and Winter (2000, 2005) in assuming that the probability distribution f of s given the state of the world G or I does not depend on the probability
that a juror receives a strong or weak signal (p). Exploring different systems of signals
could represent an interesting extension to our jury model. We thank an anonymous
referee for this suggestion.
17
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that a jury reaches a decision by taking a simultaneous vote; i.e., jurors ignore any group strategy aspects and decide independently from other jurors. This means that jurors do not vote against their signal: if
a juror receives a guilty (innocent) signal, he votes to convict (acquit). This assumption, which is the behavior assumed by Condorcet, allows us to isolate the role of
our two institutional variables from the possible effects of signaling and informational
cascades (e.g., Luppi and Parisi 2013) and the possibility of strategic voting of jurors
(e.g., Ladha 1992; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998; Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2011).
18
For the purpose of the present analysis, we focus on the outcome of a single trial.
Our basic framework can be extended to consider appeals and retrials. See Neilson
and Winter (2005).
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A wrongful acquittal occurs when (a) the defendant is guilty, which
occurs with probability P(G), but (b) the evidence is not strong
enough for a conviction. Formally, the probability of a wrongful acquittal PWA is given as
PWA = P(G)½PA F(sI + y jG) + (1 − PA )F(sI − x jG):

(2)

The ﬁrst term within the squared brackets is the probability that at
least mN jurors receive the weak signal (PA), and the evidence is not
sufﬁciently strong to convict (s < sI + y). The second term is the
probability that at least mN jurors receive the strong signal (PC) or
receive both the strong and weak signals (1 − PC − PA ), but the evidence is not sufﬁciently strong to convict (s < sI − x).
The probability of a wrongful verdict is given by PW = PWC + PWA .
A hung jury occurs (a) if the jury is neither prone to convict nor
prone to acquit, which happens with probability PB = 1 − PA − PC , and
(b) if the true strength of evidence is sufﬁciently close to the reasonabledoubt standard; that is, it ranges between sI − x and sI + y (the hungjury range, as shown in ﬁg. 1). In this range, jurors who receive the strong
signal vote to convict, and those who receive the weak signal vote to
acquit, resulting in a mistrial. Formally, the probability of a hung jury
PH is given as
PH = ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − x jI)PB + P(G)½F(sI + y jG) − F(sI − xjG)PB

(3)

where the ﬁrst term is the probability of a mistrial when the defendant is innocent, and the second term is the probability of a mistrial
when the defendant is guilty.
From the equations above, it is straightforward to derive the probability of an accurate verdict; that is, PV = 1 − PW − PH .
The social loss function, which depends on the social costs of a
wrongful conviction, of a wrongful acquittal, and of a mistrial, can
be expressed as the following:
m in L(N, m) = PWC CWC + PWA CWA + PH CH
N,m

(4)

where CH, CWA, and CWC are the monetary social costs for a hung
jury, wrongful acquittal, and wrongful conviction, respectively.19
19
As in Neilson and Winter (2000), the administrative costs of increasing N are
omitted. The social function in equation (4) is similar to the social loss function considered by Miceli (1990). The main differences are that Miceli (1990) did not analyze
jury size and voting requirement as factors inﬂuencing the accuracy of decisions and
failed to consider the costs associated with mistrials. Our social function is also comparable to the social loss function considered by Neilson and Winter (2000). The main differences are that Neilson and Winter (2000) did not analyze how different combinations
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The objective of the social planner is to minimize the social loss,
as expressed in equation (4), by optimally choosing jury size and voting requirement. In section 4, we analyze how different combinations of the two aforementioned institutional variables affect accuracy
and the social cost of criminal adjudication through changes in PWC,
PWA, and PH.
4. OPTIMAL JURY SIZE AND
VOTING REQUIREMENT
In this section, we analyze how different combinations of jury size
and voting requirement affects trial outcomes.
Let us start by discussing the benchmark case of varying jury size
under unanimous verdicts. By restating the Condorcet’s jury theorem under unanimity, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Jury-Size Effect). The probability of a wrong verdict
decreases in jury size at a decreasing rate. However, given the
greater incidence of mistrials, the probability of reaching an accurate unanimous verdict decreases in jury size at a decreasing rate.
Proof. See appendix. QED
Lemma 1 unveils an interesting trade-off. Larger juries are less likely
to be wrong but are also less likely to reach an accurate verdict because of the greater difﬁculty in deliberating unanimously.
Next, let us discuss the implications of varying the voting requirement under a given jury size.
Lemma 2 (Voting Requirement Effect). For any given jury
size, if p = :5, the probability of a wrong verdict decreases with
the voting requirement. However, given the greater incidence
of mistrials, the probability of reaching an accurate verdict decreases with the voting requirement. Each probability decreases
 if the voting requirement
at an increasing rate for m ∈ ½:5, m)
 1,
tends to the majority rule and at a decreasing rate for m ∈ (m,
 ∈ (:5, 1).
where m
Proof. See appendix. QED
Similar to what we observed in lemma 1, we can see that changes in
the voting requirement have a double-edged effect. Relaxing a jury’s
voting requirement (i.e., allowing nonunanimous verdicts) facilitates
of jury size and voting requirement affect the accuracy of adjudication and the probability
of mistrials.
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the reaching of a verdict, but at the same time, it increases the probability of adjudication errors. As the majority requirement is reduced,
more verdicts will be reached, but wrongful convictions and wrongful
acquittals will also increase.
If each juror has the same probability of receiving a strong signal
or weak signal (i.e., p = :5), lemma 2 reveals the desirability of relaxing the unanimity requirement over relaxing jury size to increase the
accuracy of verdicts. Analytically, this result is explained by the fact
that PV is concave with respect to N and convex with respect to m
(when m tends to the majority rule). Relaxing the unanimity requirement (under a ﬁxed jury size) generates a “fast” marginal increase in
the probability of accurate verdicts, whereas restricting jury size (under unanimity) generates a “slow” marginal increase in the probability of accurate verdicts.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given lemmas 1 and 2, to increase accuracy of
verdicts, relaxing the unanimity requirement down to a majority rule (for any given jury size) is a more effective alternative to
restricting jury size (under unanimity) if p = :5.
Proof. See appendix. QED
Under the constraints on jury size and voting requirement set out
by the US Supreme Court in Burch v. Louisiana, state courts are not
allowed to modify jury size and voting requirements simultaneously.
Relaxing the unanimity requirement in favor of a less demanding
majority rule yields better results in terms of accuracy of verdicts
than a reduction in jury size. Relaxing unanimity increases accuracy
at a faster rate than the corresponding change obtainable with a reduction in jury size.
Consistent with Burch v. Louisiana, proposition 1 implies that
jury size and voting requirements inversely depend on one another.
The accuracy of verdicts is maximized when requiring unanimous
verdicts for small juries or allowing nonunanimous verdicts with
large juries. These ﬁndings provide a rationale for the constraints
introduced by the US Supreme Court in Burch v. Louisiana: a combined use of small juries and nonunanimous verdicts would not be
desirable in criminal adjudication.

5. CONCLUSION
Let us now step back to review the previously stated results from a
bird’s-eye perspective. Our ﬁndings help evaluate the effect of the
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changes to jury structure brought about by the US Supreme Court
and state legislation. The results on the capacity of a jury to reach
an accurate verdict, taken in isolation, provide an economic rationale for the constraints introduced by the Burch v. Louisiana decision. Large nonunanimous juries or small unanimous juries are alternative ways to maximize the accuracy of verdicts while preserving
the functionality of juries. In the choice between these alternatives,
the vast majority of jurisdictions retained the unanimity rule, and
there is near universal acceptance to require it for capital murder
cases given the severity of the consequences resulting from wrongful
convictions. In these cases, the probability of convicting an innocent
person should be kept to a minimum, avoiding as much error as possible. Notwithstanding the limited adoption of nonunanimous juries
in US state courts, our results lend support to the elimination of the
unanimity requirement in the presence of large juries. As we move
away from capital murder cases, combining a qualiﬁed majority rule
with larger juries would seem desirable, inasmuch as the undesirability gap between wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals
narrows. Optimal jury size can even fall below the lower limit of
six members set by the US Supreme Court in the Burch v. Louisiana
case, inasmuch as juries are required to decide unanimously. Our result largely aligns with the conventional wisdom in existing literature. When unanimity is required, the use of smaller juries could reduce the probability of a single juror causing a deadlock and may be
desirable to empower the jury with the capacity to reach a verdict.
Future research in this ﬁeld should extend our analysis to investigate how optimal jury design would change when considering retrials
(Neilson and Winter 2005), correlated votes (Rubinfeld and Sappington
1987), endogenous social values of adjudication errors (Miceli 1990), behavioral cascades (Luppi and Parisi 2013), and strategic voting by jurors
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). For all these extensions, our model
could usefully serve as a building block for the understanding of more
complex jury decision-making scenarios. Finally, as shown in Pi, Parisi,
and Luppi (2020), the choice of different Blackstonian ratios by US jurisdictions indirectly implies the jurisdiction’s commitment to different
“beyond a reasonable doubt” thresholds. Our next research objective
is to explore how the jurisdictions’ choices of different standards of
proof inﬂuence their choices regarding jury size and voting requirements (Guerra and Parisi 2019).
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APPENDIX
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given m = 1, ∂PWC =∂N = ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI −
N
xjI)pN ln p and ∂PWA =∂N = ½F(sI + yjG) − F(sI − xjG)(1 − p) ln(1 − p),
which are both negative because p ∈ (0, 1). Hence, ∂PW =∂N < 0. The
2
second-order derivatives are equal to ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)pN ln p
N
2
and ½F(sI + yjG) − F(sI − xjG)(1 − p) ln (1 − p), respectively, which are
both positive. Hence, ∂2 PW =∂N 2 > 0.
Next, we prove that ∂PH =∂N > 0. Given m = 1, ∂PH =∂N = ∂PB =
∂Nf½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI) + P(G)½F(sI + yjG) − F(sI − xjG)g. Because
N
∂PB =∂N = −½(1 − p) ln(1 − p) + pN ln p, which is positive as p ∈ (0, 1),
it follows that ∂PH =∂N > 0.
Finally, we prove that ∂PV =∂N < 0, ∂2 PV =∂N 2 > 0. Given m = 1,
N
∂PV =∂N = ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)(1 − p) ln(1 − p) + P(G)½F(sI + yjG) −
N
F(sI − xjG)p ln p, which is negative because p ∈ (0, 1). The secondN
2
order derivative is equal to ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)(1 − p) ln (1 −
2
N
p) + P(G)½F(sI + yjG) − F(sI − xjG)p ln p, which is positive. QED
Proof of Lemma 2. For a given N, ∂PWC =∂m = ½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI −
xjI)∂PC =∂m, where ∂PC =∂m is equal to


pmN (1 − p)



 p 
N!
∂
N!
N ln
+
,
mN !(N − mN) !
1−p
∂m mN !(N − mN) !

N−m N

which is negative if p ≤ :5. For a given N, ∂PW A =∂m = P(G)½F(sI +
yjG) − F(sI − xjG)∂PA =∂m, where ∂PA =∂m is equal to


(1 − p)

mN

p

N−m N





N!
1−p
∂
N!
N ln
+
,
mN !(N − mN) !
p
∂m mN !(N − mN) !

which is negative if p ≥ :5. Hence, ∂PW =∂m < 0 if p = :5.
Next, we prove that ∂PH =∂m > 0. For a given N, because ∂PB =∂m =
−½∂PC =∂m + ∂PA =∂m, whereby ∂PC =∂m < 0 if p ≤ :5 and ∂PA =∂m < 0
if p ≥ :5, it follows that ∂PH =∂m > 0 if p = :5.
Finally, we prove that ∂PV =∂m < 0. For a given N, ∂PV =∂m = ½1 −
P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)∂PA =∂m + P(G)½F(sI + yjG) − F(sI − xjG)∂PC =∂m,
which is negative if p = :5.
Finally, let us analyze second-order partial derivatives with respect to m. If p = :5, the second-order partial derivative of PWC with
respect to m is


2
N!
N ∂
:
½1 − P(G)½1 − F(sI − xjI)(:5)
∂m2 mN !(N − mN) !
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To compute the second-order derivative of the factorial function, let
us consider N = 6 and marginal increases of .1 in m from m = :5 to
m = 1. The computations show that the factorial function is decreasing in m at an increasing rate for m ∈ ½:5, :8) and at a decreasing rate
for m ∈ (:8, 1. A similar trend occurs if N = 12, whereby the factorial function is decreasing in m at an increasing rate for m ∈
 denote the in½:5, :7) and at a decreasing rate for m ∈ (:7, 1. Let m
 and ∂2 PW C =
ﬂection point. Thus, ∂2 PWC =∂m2 < 0 for m ∈ ½:5 , m),
2
2
 1. The same holds for ∂ PW A =∂m2 , which is
∂m > 0 for m ∈ ( m),
2
negative. Hence, ∂ PW =∂m2 < 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 1. This follows from proofs of lemmas 1 and 2,

because ∂2 PV =∂N 2 > 0, whereas ∂2 PV =∂m2 < 0 if p = :5 and m ∈ ½0:5, m).
QED
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